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MICHEL TER HARK
UNCERTAINTY, VAGUENESS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
INDETERMINACY
Chamberlain visiting Hitler, 15 September 1938. Hitler hides his war plans
from Chamberlain and promises that peace can be preserved if the Czechs
will meet his demands. Chamberlain is fooled and tries to convince the
Czechs not to mobilize their armies. To his sister he writes: “. . . in spite
of the hardness and ruthlessness I thought I saw in his face, I got the
impression that here was a man who could be relied upon when he had
given his word . . . ”.1
Even confronted with a perfect liar like Hitler one can imagine
someone, unlike Chamberlain, being capable of detecting facial manage-
ment. Suppose Churchill had been visiting Hitler too. As some historians
have claimed, Churchill would not have been taken in by Hitler’s lies and
perhaps would have been convinced of his unreliability; perhaps he would
even have noticed thinking clues that ultimately betrayed Hitler’s lies. Dis-
cussing Hitler’s reliability afterwards, Churchill and Chamberlain might
have disagreed and the former might not have succeeded in convincing the
latter of Hitler’s unreliability.
These sorts of uncertainty and disagreement often characterize our
judgements about other people’s thoughts and feelings. In his later writ-
ings on the philosophy of psychology Wittgenstein is engaged with just
these sorts of what I will call psychological indeterminacy. The core of
his approach is to accept and to describe psychological indeterminacy as
it is. At the same time he shows that the various indeterminate aspects of
the meaning of psychological concepts may tempt philosophers to a false
model of the mental as something hidden, possibly in the form of physiolo-
gical states and processes, behind overt behaviour. This false model leads
philosophers to explain psychological indeterminacy away as a shortcom-
ing in the available evidence and to make it look more determinate than it
is.
My aim in this article is to argue that by employing the notion of
indirect evidence in their account of the meaning and epistemology of
psychological judgements, the currently dominant physicalistic tradition
in the philosophy of mind has yielded to this temptation . Ironically, phys-
icalistic arguments to the effect that we have only indirect knowledge
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of other person’s thoughts, feelings and motives have been a reaction
against the supposed operationalism and behaviourism of the Wittgen-
steinian tradition. Therefore, I will argue first that this operationalistic
reading of Wittgenstein is deeply mistaken. In particular I will show that
Wittgenstein’s notorious remark to the effect that ‘An “inner process”
stands in need of outward criteria’ – which has played a crucial role in
the operationalistic reception – has to be read along completely different
lines.
I will proceed as follows. In Section 1, I outline the reception of Wit-
tgenstein’s philosophy of mind by physicalistic philosophers. In Section
2, I will argue that the main mistake of both the operationalistic reading
of Wittgenstein and the physicalistic alternative to the meaning and epi-
stemology of psychological concepts is a commitment to referentialism.
In Sections 3 and 4, I will show in more detail how the referentialistic
view that the meaning of concepts like thinking and remembering is
their reference to mental processes gives a completely distorted picture
of their meaning. In Section 5, I outline the physicalistic view according
to which the uncertainty of psychological judgements in the third person
results from our (current) epistemic situation. In Section 6, I will dis-
tinguish between psychological indeterminacy and epistemic uncertainty
and argue that the latter notion only seems to give an adequate account
of psychological judgements because of misleading analogies with other
sorts of judgement. In the final section, the indeterminacy of psychological
concepts is explained in terms of the notion of patterns of life.
1. THE RECEIVED VIEW OF THE WITTGENSTEINIAN TRADITION
Paul Churchland has recently summarized the currently dominant view
concerning the meaning and epistemology of psychological judgements:
"The Behaviourist attempt to forge a ‘logical’ connection between inner
states and overt behaviour, and the Argument from Analogy’s attempt to
forge an inductive connection between them, can both be put aside in fa-
vour of the quite different hypothetico-deductive connection implied by
Sellar’s account. Third-person ascriptions of mental states are typically
singular explanatory hypotheses from which we can draw, in the context
of folk psychology as a whole, consequences concerning the subject’s
observable behaviour".2 Influential propounders of this socalled theory
approach to the meaning of psychological concepts, like Armstrong, Fodor
and Churchland have put forward their views in response to behaviourism,
in particular ‘the Wittgensteinian tradition’ in the philosophy of mind.
Indeed, the attempt to forge an empirical (i.e., theoretical) connection
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between overt behaviour and inner states has been viewed as a reversal
of Wittgenstein’s claim that “An ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward
criteria”.3 As Fodor and Chihara put this with respect to the ‘pain syn-
drome’: “Here, as elswhere, an ‘outer’ process stands in need of an inner
process” (Chihara and Fodor 1991, 147).
According to Armstrong’s and Churchland’s interpretive opinion, “The
phrase ‘inner process’ refers to mental happenings of the sort that, prima
facie, seem quite different from bodily behaviour: such things as thoughts
and sensations”.4 In saying that thoughts and sensations stand in need of
outward criteria “Wittgenstein seems to be saying that there is a logically
necessary connection between the former and the latter” (ibid.). Arm-
strong and Churchland maintain that this is problematic since it requires
Wittgenstein to assert a logically necessary connection between ‘distinct
existences’.5 The alternative reading to which Armstrong inclines is that
Wittgenstein seeks to make an ontological reduction of inner processes to
bodily behaviour, according to which ‘inner processes’ are not really any-
thing distinct from bodily behaviour. “This interpretation is strengthened
if we notice the quotation marks that enclose the phrase ‘inner process’,
marks absent in the case of the phrase ‘outward criteria’ ” (ibid.).
There are several problems with this interpretation of Wittgenstein’s
notorious remark, but for the moment it is important to note that Wit-
tgenstein explicitly disavows ontological reductionism or eliminativism:
“Why should I deny that there is a mental process?”.6 And in more recently
published work he says: “. . . it is as if I wanted to explain (quasi-define)
the inner through the outer. And yet it is not so”.7 And: “ ‘Mental’ for me
is not a metaphysical, but a logical epithet” (ibid.). Wittgenstein, then, is
not taking a stance regarding the ontology of mental states and processes.
Chihara and Fodor seem to recognize this, since they interpret Wittgen-
stein as a logical behaviourist. Logical behaviourism, as Steven Stich puts
it, is a verificationist doctrine which holds that “all meaningful empirical
terms must be definable in terms of observables”.8 Or as Putnam remarks
á propos of Ryle, who belongs to the Wittgensteinian tradition, logical
behaviourism is the thesis that “all talk about mental events is translat-
able into talk about actual or potential overt behavior”.9 In the same vein
Chihara and Fodor compare Wittgenstein’s view with the view espoused
by the psychologist Hull, according to whom it is a condition upon the
coherent employment of mental predicates “that they be severally related
to behavioral predicates and that some of these relations be logical . . . ”.10
There are many passages in Wittgenstein’s work, however, that are
in direct conflict with logical behaviourism.11 Indeed, the general spirit
of Wittgenstein’s work is to differentiate psychological concepts from
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behavioural concepts rather than likening them in the style of logical be-
haviourism. As he puts it succinctly: “There are inner concepts and outer
concepts”.12
At other places in Fodor’s work, however, it becomes clear that his
worry with logical behaviourism is not so much conceptual as ontological.
For instance, in his The Language of Thought, Fodor claims that the ‘ori-
ginal sin’ of the Wittgensteinian tradition is to confuse mentalism with
dualism. About one member of this tradition he says: “. . . Ryle assumes
(as most psychologists who take a Realistic view of the designata of men-
tal terms in psychological theories would not) that a mentalist must be a
dualist”.13
On this reading of the Wittgensteinian tradition, its fundamental mis-
take would be ontological, since this tradition would assume that if
psychological terms are construed as referring to inner states and pro-
cesses, these states and processes necessarily must be Cartesian states and
processes. Since, according to behaviourism and other variants of mater-
ialism, ontological dualism is false, the only remaining option is to shift
the reference of psychological terms from inner states and processes to
behavioural states and processes. To which mentalism replies that their
reference can be shifted back again to (higher-level) properties of brain
states.
2. REFERENTIALISM
Fodor’s mistake is not so much to think that the Wittgensteinian tradition
would assume that ‘a mentalist must be a dualist’, rather his mistake is
to assume that this tradition would adhere to a referentialistic view of
the meaning of psychological language to which logical behaviourism,
dualism, mentalism and eliminative materialism clearly belong. Indeed,
maintaining, as Fodor does, that the meaning of psychological terms is not
an inner Cartesian state or process but a mentalistic (or functional) state or
process remains within the referentialistic view, according to which the
primary role of psychological words is to stand for or refer to things,
properties and processes. Referentialism is one of the main targets of
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology. His reason is that referential-
ism becomes problematic in areas where it does not apply. Especially
in psychological areas, words and sentences are treated on the model of
words and sentences that do have a rather simple and perspicuous ref-
erence (‘table’, ‘rod’, ‘bodily movement’, ‘neuronal process’, ‘internal
state’, etc.) and in this way are provided with a nonexistent reference.
Many of Wittgenstein’s remarks which seem to amount to an ontological
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denial of mental states and processes are in fact a rejection of an over-
simplified treatment of the meaning of psychological concepts inspired by
a referentialistic model. As he puts it: “What we deny is that the picture
of the inner process gives us the correct idea of the use of the word ‘to
remember’ ”.14
This criticism does not imply that Wittgenstein would impose a ban on
the use of the word ‘inner process’, or ‘mental process’. In an ordinary or
scientific context (say in a setting in which one’s memory capacity is being
tested), saying ‘ “There has just taken place in me the mental process of
remembering . . . ” means nothing more than: “I have just remembered . . . ”.
To deny the mental process would mean to deny the remembering; to deny
that anyone ever remembers’ (PI, par. 306). In such a case, remembering
is not a hidden inner process that has to be inferred from the observation
of overt behaviour; rather it is an ability or a complex of abilities of the
subject. Even outside such a context the term ‘mental process’ can have a
sense. For instance, if a philosopher says, ‘Thinking is a mental process’,
the expression ‘mental process’ is intended to distinguish conscious ex-
perience from physical processes. Whether this is indeed the philosopher’s
intention, however, is seriously to be questioned. In philosophical discus-
sions about the mind-body problem, a different ‘sense’ of the term ‘mental
process’ prevails, one which is described by Wittgenstein as follows: ‘. . .
the expression “mental process” suggests that we are concerned with im-
perfectly understood processes in an inaccessible sphere’ 15 (PG, p. 106).
It is in particular this ‘use’ of the term ‘mental process’ that Wittgenstein
attacks.
A good example of this view of mental processes is provided by the
physicalistic tradition in the mind-body problem that was initiated by Arm-
strong. This is how he introduces the mind-body problem. First he speaks
of a traditional picture according to which the body is a thing and the mind
is also a thing. “This thing, or arena, may be in one or another of a huge
variety of mental states, and a huge variety of mental events and processes
go on in it”.16 Subsequently he says that “the picture, or theory as I shall
henceforth call it, is somewhat vague about the exact nature of the mind”
(ibid.) Mind-body theories, like dualism and physicalism are attempts to
make this vague picture more precise.
On a Wittgensteinian view, the attempt to turn the vague picture of
inner processes and outer behaviour into a more determinate theory is
precisely what leads philosophers astray. The vague picture can be made
more determinate only by treating psychological concepts on the model
of concepts that have a quite perspicuous reference. This model attrib-
utes a certain (grammatical) form to psychological phenomena, but the
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actual form is much more complex and entirely different. Therefore, al-
though the attempt to make a certain picture more precise is undertaken
in order to explain the meaning of psychological concepts, it in fact
makes no connection at all with the phenomena it is intended to illum-
inate.
It is not just referentialism that is the cause of the trouble, according
to Wittgenstein. Instead, referentialism seems to go hand in hand with es-
sentialism. Our use of psychological concepts is diverse. ‘Understanding’,
for instance, is not just one sort of process, rather it is a pattern of more or
less similar processes in certain circumstances. (Perhaps Armstrong’s use
of the predicate ‘vague’ is an expression of this fact). In their search for
what is common in all such cases, philosophers and scientists often try to
single out a particular form of understanding as paradigmatic, for instance
translating one language into another. If one subsequently realises that this
supposed paradigmatic use does not fit the diversity of cases after all, the
conclusion which forces itself upon one is that the essence of the process
of understanding is hidden, something which is not yet discovered, due
to the lack of a suitable model or proper instruments for measuring the
process. The reasoning behind all this is that since we use in all these
different cases one and the same word, i.e., ‘understanding’, there must be
something which is the essence of understanding. For why else would we
use the same word for all these cases?
Such referentialistic and essentialistic views seem to be the point of the
important §308 of the Philosophical Investigations in which Wittgenstein
asks how the mind-body problem arises in the first place. The hallmark
of especially physicalistic theories about mental states and processes is
that they “leave their nature undecided” (§308). For instance, after the re-
jection of the Wittgensteinian tradition Smart, Armstrong and Lewis have
defended topic-neutral analyses of mental concepts, according to which
talk about ‘pain’, ‘beliefs’ or ‘desires’ is talk about “whatever comes
sufficiently close to playing a certain causal role describable in physical
language, and bears physicalistically or topic-neutrally describable rela-
tions to other physicalistically or topic-neutrally describable states”.17 On
Lewis’ theory, these causal roles are even fixed by an underlying common
sense theory. For instance, ‘headache’, according to Lewis, is “whatever
has the functional role psychological theory assigns headaches”.18 Next
topic-neutralism predicts that neuroscience will discover that the unspe-
cified causal roles will be played by neural states and processes. Hence,
mental states and processes are physiological states and processes. Wit-
tgenstein has presaged this sort of argument when he continues §308 thus:
“Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them – we think. But that
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is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we
have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better”.
By speaking of mental states and processes the more precise determ-
ination of which is put off, philosophers and scientists treat psychological
concepts on the model of physical concepts. In particular, the concept of
mental processes is modeled on the concept of physical processes of which
we do know what it means to understand them better and to determine
their nature more exactly. For instance, we know what such physical pro-
cesses as eating, writing and speaking are and scientific investigations have
determined more precisely the exact nature of photosynthesis, digestion
or erosion. By assimilating mental processes to such physical processes,
philosophers not only think that they understand their own talk of men-
tal processes but also believe to have explained the meaning of ordinary
psychological concepts more adequately than theories that eschew any
reference to internal states and processes. Wittgenstein’s point is that an
expression like ‘I remember that p’ is not made meaningful by reference
to hidden mental processes. Such ‘explanations’ merely assume the ap-
pearance of being meaningful by the (mistaken) analogy with sentences
about all sorts of physical processes. Wittgenstein’s aim in his long and
detailed treatment of separate psychological concepts is precisely to show
why these analogies between mental and physical processes are off the
mark.
3. THINKING AND REMEMBERING
In a number of remarks in the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein
discusses the confusions that result when ‘thinking’, or ‘remembering’ are
construed on the (physiological) paradigm of as yet unknown processes.
Those who appeal to this (physiological) paradigm must use the word
‘mental process’ as it is used in talk about physical processes. With respect
to the latter class, there are all sorts of established criteria of identity for the
use of ‘physical process’ such that one can determine when such processes
start, in which phase they are, which events take place in a certain phase,
how one phase causally determines a subsequent phase, when the whole
process repeats itself and when and why it is interrupted. For instance,
the digestive process starts in the mouth. Our teeth break down the food
and mix it with saliva. Once the food is swallowed, it is propelled down
to the stomach. The stomach begins to secrete hydrochloric acid and the
enzime pepsin. The former breaks the food into small particles and the
latter breaks peptide bonds, thus beginning the process of breaking pro-
teins in the food into their constituent amino acids. The stomach empties
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into the duodenum which in its turn communicates with the pancreas in
which enzymes break down proteins, lipids, starch and nucleid acids, thus
continuing the digestive process.
Thinking, instead, cannot be divided into segments, or composed into
elementary units.19 The point here is not simply that we do not speak of
thinking as we do of paradigm processes, as if the issue is solely a matter of
linguistic usage (and a form of conceptual conservatism). Rather the point
is that modeling the concept of thinking and remembering on the scheme
of (known or unknown) physiological processes, gives a completely dis-
torted picture of how we use the concepts of thinking and remembering
in all sorts of language-games (scientific psychological language-games
included).20 For instance, while acknowledging that we do speak of ‘the
speed of thought’ , as if it were a process, Wittgenstein points to some
crucial differences between ‘mental processes’ and physical processes,
such as speaking or writing. For instance, one can measure the speed of
speaking, but there is no comparable sense in which one can measure the
speed of thinking. To be sure, a psychologist can measure how long it
takes someone to solve a mathematical problem during a test, but this is a
measurement of his ability and not of a hidden mental process. Again, if
‘thinking’ is a process comparable to digestion, it is natural to ask whether
the same process takes place in a lightning-like thought “only extremely
accelerated” (§318). The difference between the normal cases in which we
think while we write or speak and the case in which we have a lightning-
like thought, however, is not analogous to a clock which runs down “bit
by bit, braked by the words” and a clock which “runs down all at once”
(ibid.). Rather, a lightning-like thought is to be compared with one’s ability
to make a note of a thought in a few words. By contrast, a clock that
runs down all at once does not abstract the more important steps from
the less important ones. To the extent that a lightning-like thought is not
to be conceived as an accelerated version of a slow thought, the analogy
between talk about ‘mental processes’ of thinking and physical processes
of digestion is off the mark.
Let us consider another example of Wittgenstein in more detail, his dis-
cussion of continuing a train of thought after being interrupted (§633ff.).
One is sometimes interrupted as one is about to say something. If later
asked what one was going to do or say, one can normally remember per-
fectly clearly. According to Wittgenstein this experience is “like following
out a line of thought from brief notes” (§634). It is not a matter of recalling
the events, thoughts and experiences that preoccupied us before the inter-
ruption. In particular, it is not a matter of interpreteting such evidence, for,
as he puts it, the evidence may be very fragmentary and ‘scanty’, allowing
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many divergent readings. Nonetheless this scanty evidence effectuates that
we know how we would have proceeded and we have no doubts about
how we would have completed the interrupted train of thought. What is
meant by saying that one meant at time t such and such, therefore, is
not a report based on the recollection and interpretation of remembered
evidence. From this it follows that later judgements about what one meant
at time t are not to be explained by referring to states or processes that
occurred at t . In particular, what happened at t does not contain – like a
seed – the disposition to recount what it is that one were going to say.
(Similarly, the brief mnemonic notes do not somehow store up the line of
thought). Rather, one’s later act of resuming the current of thoughts and
experiences which preoccupied one at t is constitutive of the meaning of
the earlier thoughts and experiences.
To be sure, one may call this resuming of the current a mental process,
but it is clear that the criteria for speaking of this process are very different
from the criteria for the occurrence of physical processes. In the case of
the digestive process, knowing how the process would have gone on had
it not been interrupted, is based on reading this off from the process as it
proceeded until time t at which a break occurred. In the case of thoughts,
instead, what happens later than t is what constitues someone’s having
meant such and such. Of course, in the case of digestion we might also
look at what happens later but in that case what happens later is empirical
evidence for something else: the break at t in a metabolic process. In the
case of remembering what one was about to say, the verbal expression, ‘I
wanted to say that . . . ’, is essential to this practice and not a surrogate we
reach after, because we are incapable of tracing certain underlying inner
processes. For if this were a case of insufficient evidence it should have to
be possible to say of what the evidence is insufficient. As we have seen,
however, this is precisely what makes no sense to say in this context. In
this respect there is again a deep disanalogy between ‘inner processes’ and
(internal) physical processes.
The physicalist may of course shift more and more in the direction of a
purely neurophysiological account of mental processes.21 But if this shift
takes place, the relevant psychological concepts need to be redefined in
such a radical way that their new definition probably leads to their elimin-
ation. Note also that on the theory of Armstrong and Lewis, psychological
concepts are defined in terms of hidden, functional processes with the goal
of facilitating the discovery of their neurophysiological ‘realizers’. How-
ever, if the concept of a mental process is already understood in terms of
a neurophysiological process, then its heuristic function becomes empty,
since it is no longer understood in advance of such discoveries.22
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4. THE REAL NEED OF CRITERIA
Wittgenstein’s notorious use of the term criterion should be seen in this
light. Saying that remembering what one was about to say starts with the
later linguistic act of resuming the thread is to say that this linguistic act
is part of what we mean by this sort of remembering, that is, it is one
of the criteria for using the concept of remembering. The appeal to cri-
teria is merely to mark the difference in use of psychological concepts
and physical concepts and serves to remind philosophers of the actual
use of psychological concepts, a use which is blocked from view when
psychological concepts are treated on the model of physical states and
processes.
Operationalistic readings of the Wittgensteinian tradition, as espoused
by Fodor and Churchland, have precisely overlooked the differences
between the use of psychological concepts and physical concepts. Accord-
ing to such readings, Wittgenstein would have developed some canonical
procedure the appeal to which would make every statement testable. That
is, just as learning the meaning of ‘length’ is learning to perform the relev-
ant operations and thereby to arrive at the truth or falsity of such statements
as ‘x is three feet long’, learning the meaning of ‘pain’ or ‘dream’ is
determined by operations or observations.23 In both cases this procedure
must be something that can be appealed to as an independent check, that
is, an operation that can be performed by others too. This leads to logical
behaviourism, for if we can speak meaningfully only about what others
can check, then the meaning of psychological concepts must be describ-
able in terms of overt behaviour.24 Received view, then, has it that criteria
would be needed because otherwise mental processes would not be pub-
licly accessible processes. On the operationalistic reading of Wittgenstein,
criterial connections between patterns of behaviour and particular kinds
of mental states and processes are needed in order to ensure that mental
states and processes are present. Against this view the Fodor–Churchland
tradition maintains that we do not rely on criterial connections; rather, we
rely on an empirical theory that enables us to infer to the presence of such
states and processes as the best explanation of overt behaviour.
Operationalistic and mentalistic theories alike, however, assume the
very point at issue: that the notion of inner processes in itself is clear
enough and that the only problem is how to detect them. The point of
Wittgenstein’s appeal to criteria, instead, is not to ensure the existence
of otherwise unverifiable inner processes, but to remind us of the clash
between the actual use of psychological concepts and the model that we
have formed of them in theoretical explanations. Philosophical worries
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about the nature of mental states and processes are not solved by devel-
oping more ingenious methods of verification and investigation but by
pointing out that the nature of ‘mental states and processes’ is completely
different from what the over-simplified referentialistic model suggests.
In particular Wittgenstein’s treatment of the concept of dreaming is
relevant in this context, since it has been a target of criticism in the
Fodor-Churchland tradition. Wittgenstein’s remarks about this concept are
precisely meant to point out the difference between what we call describing
a dream and describing the length of a rod. To be sure, dream reports are
descriptions of dreams, but unlike descriptions of the length of tables and
chairs, telling what one has dreamt is the criterion for saying that the
description ‘agrees’ with what is being described. By contrast, no one
would say that telling what the length of a table is, is the criterion for
saying that the report agrees with the actual length of the table. On the
contrary, in the case of the table there is (logically) room for a distinction
between the speaker giving a truthful account of what he measures and the
account being true. In this linguistic practice there is provided for mistake,
error and correction. Therefore, being true amounts to something different
in the case of dreams than in the case of physical objects. In the case
of dreams their truth is guaranteed by special criteria of truthfullness.25
Insisting upon an independent check in the case of dream telling would
amount to disregarding the person’s own (sincere) confirmation, and it is
not implausible to say that this would amount to a change in the concept of
dreaming. To be sure, to the extent that an attitude of trust enters into the
meaning of certain psychological concepts, there is room for discrepancies
in people’s judgements about thoughts, feelings and dreams, since people
differ in both how trustworthy and how trustful they are. But then, such
discrepancies and disagreements are precisely what differentiates the use
of psychological concepts from the use of, say, mathematical or physical
concepts. The point of Wittgenstein’s remarks are the concept of dreaming,
therefore, is just to highlight this difference between indeterminate criteria
for inner processes (i.e., the person’s own confirmation) and determinate
criteria for (internal) physical processes.
Contrary to what Armstrong and Fodor suppose, therefore, the quo-
tation marks around ‘inner processes’ (in PI, §580) do not point to the
non-existence (or existence) of inner processes, for such ontological claims
would be acceptable only if the philosophical use of the picture of inner
processes would give us the correct idea of the actual use of psychological
concepts. Indeed, denying that ‘inner processes’ in the philosophical sense
exist, would presuppose what Wittgenstein has denied: that we understand
the term ‘inner process’. We do not understand the ‘use’ of this term and
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we only think to understand it because of the mistaken analogy with phys-
ical processes. The point of this remark is remarkably simple, for it merely
wishes to remind us that we should not forget that the term ‘inner process’
is in need of (normal) explanations of its meaning or, what comes to the
same, public criteria. As the quotes from Armstrong in Section 3 indicated,
the picture of inner processes is so natural and deeply entrenched that
philosophers use it in their theories about the mind as if it is in no need
of an explanation or criteria at all. But the primitive idea that the mind
is a thing in which mental processes take place is already on the wrong
track, since it derives its supposed meaning from the mistaken analogy
with (internal) physical processes.
5. INDIRECT EVIDENCE AND UNCERTAIN CRITERIA
Arguing that criteria are used to forge a logical connection between inner
states and processes on the one hand and overt behaviour on the other,
as Paul Churchland maintains, not only assumes that the philosophical
model of inner processes is clear, but also turns criteria into determin-
ate and independent operationalistic tests. As we have seen in the last
section, criteria are merely called upon in order to remind us of the ac-
tual use of psychological concepts. This actual use is overwhelmingly
complex and interwoven with our forms of life. Describing criteria for
different sorts of psychological concepts, then, is to remind philosophers
precisely of the indeterminacy and context-dependency of their use. In his
Last Writings on the philosophy of psychology, Wittgenstein turns to a
detailed description of the many forms of psychological indeterminacy and
context-dependency of psychological concepts, in particular in their third
person use. Rather than explaining such indeterminacies away, Wittgen-
stein wishes us to accept them as a constitutive feature of psychological
concepts.
Emphasizing an indeterminacy in the application of psychological con-
cepts is not to point to an epistemic shortcoming in the available evidence,
rather it is to say that psychological indeterminacy is a constitutive feature
of those concepts. In this respect there is a great divide between a Wittgen-
steinian philosophy of mind and the physicalistic tradition from logical
behaviourism to mentalism and eliminativism. In particular, mentalism and
eliminativism maintain that the reason the evidence is indeterminate can
only be that it is incomplete and that the decisive part of it is hidden. As
Paul Churchland has described the problem of determining what another
person thinks or feels: ‘To infer the (hidden) occurrence of certain kinds
of mental states from the occurrence of certain kinds of behavior is to
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assume that appropriate general connections hold between them . . . .26
Since “all one can observe is one-half of the alledged connection: the
creature’s behavior” (ibid., 68), the question is how one can be justified in
believing that the connections are true of the other person/organism. And
as I already referred to at the beginning of section, according to Churchland
a theoretical inference to underlying inner states and processes is the best
way to determine what another person thinks or feels.
According to Wittgenstein, the philosophical appeal to the model of
hidden inner states and processes and overt behaviour is an illusion:
It is not the relationship of the inner to the outer that explains the uncertainty of the evid-
ence, but rather the other way around – the relationship is only a picture-like representation
of this uncertainty.27
Elsewhere Wittgenstein calls the picture “I cannot know what is going on
in him” a very convincing picture (PI II, 223) and it is clear that his goal
is not to eliminate this picture but to investigate how it is actually applied.
In its non-philosophical use, this picture poses no problems. For instance,
if one meaningfully says, ‘Only I know my thoughts’, the circumstances
in which one says this are roughly the circumstances in which one might
also have said, ‘I will never tell you my secrets’. In these circumstances
doubting what another person is thinking clearly makes sense but then the
uncertainty is de facto and can be removed through appropriate behaviour
in certain circumstances.28 This practical employment of the picture of
inner processes does not legitimise the philosophical and sceptical ex-
tension, according to which inner processes are something that goes on
behind words and ways of behaving and which can never be known by
other people. Failure to see how this picture is actually applied, however,
leads philosophers into drawing misleading analogies which obscure rather
than explain the distinguishing features of psychological concepts. In par-
ticular it leads them into supposing that the constitutive indeterminacy is
an empirical defect due to our insufficient knowledge of the underlying
mechanisms of thought and feeling.
To see how entrenched this model is, consider the following passages
from David Hume, written at about two hundred years before the rise of
brain research. After having emphasized that, “The same motives always
produce the same actions: The same events follow the same causes”,29 in
all nations and ages, Hume admits that it is possible ‘to find some actions,
which seem to have no regular connexion with any known motives . . . ’
(p. 86). Hume’s reply is important. The vulgar, Hume argues, is inclined
to “attribute the uncertainty of events to such an uncertainty in the causes
as makes the latter often fail of their usual influence . . . ” (ibid.). Then
he invokes the analogy with a complicated mechanism: “A peasant can
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give no better reason for the stopping of any clock or watch than to say
that it does not commonly go right: But an artist easily perceives that the
same force in the spring or pendulum has always the same influence on the
wheels; but fails of its usual effect, perhaps by reason of a grain of dust,
which puts a stop to the whole movement. From the observation of several
parallel instances, philosophers form a maxim that the connexion between
all causes and effects is equally necessary, and that its seeming uncertainty
in some instances proceeds from the secret opposition of contrary causes”
(p. 87).
Two hundred years later physicalistic philosophers of mind similarly
argue that the uncertainty of human behaviour is due to our lack of know-
ledge of mental processes or brain processes. Consider, for instance, this
passage from the first proponent of a theory approach, Feigl: “We do have
‘criteria’ for discriminating between mere pretending and genuine feeling,
but these criteria are never stable in the form of necessary and sufficient
conditions. They must be regarded as probabilistic indicators very much
in the manner in which symptoms in general medicine are regarded as
probabilistic indicators of diseases”.30
Feigl seems to accept that ordinary criteria for ascribing feelings to
other people are indeterminate, but he immediately goes on to explain this
as a lack in the available evidence due to our insufficient knowledge of
the underlying causes in the mind/brain.31 Like Churchland, then, Feigl
explains the uncertainty and disagreement in our ordinary use of psy-
chological concepts as a sign of the hiddenness of thoughts and feelings
and, hence, as proof of the insufficiency and unreliability of behavioural
indicators. On this view, human behaviour is turned into indirect evid-
ence for underlying inner processes much like symptoms of diseases are
(un)reliable indicators of virusses.
I will argue that by this notion of indirect evidence, the theory approach
confuses what Wittgenstein would call grammatical or normative propos-
itions with empirical assertions or generalisations about how things (in
the mind/brain) are. In particular, by misunderstanding claims about the
indeterminacy of psychological concepts on the model of empirical sen-
tences about what we do not (yet) know, psychological indeterminacy gets
equated with or reduced to a form of epistemic uncertainty and, hence,
is supposed to be simply due to insufficient empirical information. My
point is not to deny that there is much we do not know about “the nature
and dynamics of mental illness, the faculty of creative imagination, or the
ground of intelligence differences between individuals”.32 Rather the point
is that our ‘lack of knowledge’, when we do not know what other people
are thinking, or when we do not know if they are truthful to us, or when we
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do not know what to say at all because their behaviour is ambiguous, is not
the same as our lack of empirical knowledge of what goes on in the brain
of people who are speaking language or what happens in their stomach
when digesting food.
6. PSYCHOLOGICAL INDETERMINACY AND EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY
At first sight Feigl’s point seems to be correct: we do not dispose of
conclusive evidence for discriminating between mere pretending and genu-
ine expressions of feelings. Supposing otherwise is to commit oneself to
an untenable behaviourism. The problem, however, is that Feigl offers a
(causal) explanation of the absence of conclusive criteria. This explanation
is tempting precisely because of the assimilation of psychological concepts
to medical ones. In medical (or psycho-physiological) contexts uncer-
tainty is clearly due to our having insufficient knowledge of (viral) causes
within the body, and in these contexts the uncertainty can be remedied
by scientific research. On this view, psychological uncertainty arises only
because of our supposed inadequate ways of telling what another person
thinks or feels, and the absence of conclusive criteria for thoughts and feel-
ings of other people appears to be a defect caused by unknown empirical
facts.
The core of the theory approach, then, can be expressed in terms of the
following proposition: ‘The fact that you cannot get inside another’s mind
seems to preclude access to feelings or thoughts which would decisively
settle the presence of a certain desire or thought’. ‘Cannot’, in this pro-
position, is taken in the sense of a physical impossibility just like ’cannot’
in the medical case. On this view, the proposition expresses that it is very
unlikely that we can get inside another’s mind (or brain). As we can always
improve our knowledge, what is unlikely now can become very probably or
even certain in the (distant) future.33 I will argue that the theory approach
does not distinguish here between a physical and a logical impossibility.34
The indeterminacy of psychological concepts cannot be explained in terms
of what is physically impossible or very unlikely, for this would amount to
reducing psychological indeterminacy to epistemic vagueness.
To appreciate clearly the difference between a physical impossibility
and a logical impossibility we can go back to the Tractatus where it is
proposed that a physically impossible state of affairs presents us with a
thinkable state of affairs, one we can picture to ourselves.35 Thus I can
imagine winning from Carl Lewis at the Olympic Games, although I would
certainly loose if I were to try. More generally, to conclude that something
is physically impossible is to have made an attempt or an (scientific) ex-
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periment which has failed to establish what it ought to establish. What
follows from this is that the very possibility of making the attempt or
the experiment implies that one can describe or model what it is that one
cannot do or cannot know.
A sentence expressing a logical impossibility, instead, has no descript-
ive function at all and therefore does not describe what it is that one
cannot know or cannot do. In particular, a sentence expressing a logical
impossibility does not describe what never in fact happens. Wittgenstein’s
later comparison between language and games is instructive in this respect.
To say that one cannot score a goal in tennis is to express a rule which
excludes certain moves from the game of tennis. The modal term ‘cannot’
in this example does not convey that there is something one is physically
prevented from doing in this game, for in that case it would make sense
to say that one will make the attempt to score a goal in tennis. And where
one person may fail in this attempt another person might succeed. But it is
clear that if someone were to try to score a goal in tennis we should object
that he was not playing the game, which is tantamount to saying that this
is not what we would call ‘tennis’.36
The use of the term ‘cannot’ in the case of tennis is not really mislead-
ing, and it is easily seen that the term is normative, i.e., the expression
of a rule rather than an empirical claim about what one is causally pre-
vented from doing. ‘Cannot’ in the philosophical proposition, ‘One cannot
really know what another person thinks’, however, conceals such a rule.
Although the proposition does not mention a word, still it expresses a rule
or convention about the use of words and imparts no empirical information
about our cognitive shortcomings. That physicalistic philosophers have not
seen this is not only due to the term ‘cannot’ but also to the analogies they
keep on making with other types of knowledge claims.
The analogies with medical symptoms and hearing noise from a room
next have in common that they are all concerned with situations in which
we have only indirect evidence for our knowledge claims and where we
are physically prevented from gaining more direct evidence. Hearing noise
coming from an adjacent room is indirect evidence for the belief that there
is a party going on there. One could easily gain direct evidence for one’s
belief by going into the room and seeing what is happening there. Suppose
that one does not want to go there, or finds that the door is blocked and that
nobody opens when one tries to get in, then this would be a clear example
of, respectively, a psychological and physical impossibility. In the case of
diseases it is often more difficult to get direct evidence for the presence of
certain viruses. Still even in the case of diseases, the viral causes of which
are not known, the impossibility of knowing is physical, since scientists
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can make models which show what it is that they do not know: certain
viral causes. What has to be discovered is whether the model corresponds
to the facts.
Although the analogy with the room may illustrate that we (often) do go
beyond what is observed, it is in no way a good analogy of the uncertainty
of psychological judgements. Indeed, it is a very clear example of why the
analogy is mistaken. For the essential point of difference between hearing
a noise and observing human behaviour is that in the former case it is
possible to describe what it would be like to go into the room and look
for the person. This means that one can say what it is that one cannot do
or know. The impossibility, therefore, is physical. Put otherwise, in the
case of the room there are in fact two ways of describing the evidence,
indirectly via the noise and directly by going into the room and pointing
at or looking after the person. In the case of other people’s thoughts and
feelings however there is just one way of describing the evidence, e.g., by
listening to and looking at the person, by conversing with him, by knowing
his circumstances, etc. As there is no direct evidence here, it is very mis-
leading to speak of indirect evidence, since the use of this term suggests
that the two opposites are significant here.37
Consider the following dialogue from John Updike’s novel Marry
Me. Jerry and Ruth are a couple, and Ruth has a secret relation with
Jerry’s friend Richard. Ruth finally breaks the relation because Jerry had
frightened her by overhearing the tag end of a phone conversation with
Richard. To his question:
‘Who was that?’ she panicked and says ‘Some woman from the
Sunday School’ . . .
“Somehow”, he said, not looking up, “I don’t believe you”.
“Why not? What did you hear?”
“Nothing. It was your tone of voice”.
“Really? How?” She wanted to giggle.
“It was different”, he said. “Warmer. It was a woman’s voice”.
“I am a woman”.
Richard is willing to to do anything to experience what Ruth is thinking,
but what steps is he to take when he distrusts Ruth? Begging her to tell him
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what she is thinking need not help. In such a case there are no means of
enquiring analogous to the case of the room.38
To say that there is no direct evidence in the case of thoughts and
feelings is not to say that there is something we are causally prevented
from knowing or investigating. This is what could be said in the case of
human diseases or of Hume’s complicated mechanism. Wittgenstein also
mentions a complicated mechanism, the output of which is unpredictable
due to insufficient knowledge of its inner workings. In contrast to Hume,
however, Wittgenstein refers to such a mechanism in order to point out
the disanalogy with the unpredictability and uncertainty of human beha-
viour: “But with a human being, the assumption is that it is impossible
to gain insight into the mechanism. Thus indeterminacy is postulated”.39
The expression ‘I can never know what goes on in him’ is like ‘I can
never score a goal in tennis’ and unlike ‘I can never win of Carl Lewis
at the Olympic Games’. The absence of conclusive criteria resides in the
(normative) rules or methods for using psychological concepts and is in
that respect analogous to the absence of the possibility of scoring a goal
in tennis or the absence of a king in draughts; the rules of use of these
concepts do not provide for these possibilities. Hence, what looks like an
empirical defect in our knowledge, to be remedied by a more sophistic-
ated scientific or epistemological theory, in fact betokens a constitutive
difference in language-games.40
The point is not that the theory approach is mistaken in claiming that
one cannot know conclusively whether another person really feels pain by
observing his behaviour or by listening to what he says. Rather the point
is that this (philosophical) uncertainty resides in the concept of pain and
not in some as yet unknown facts within his mind or brain. The theory
approach, therefore, has confused what is not provided for by the rules of
psychological concepts – a logical impossibility – with hidden facts we
are physically prevented from knowing – a physical impossibility. By this
confusion they have been unaware of the nature of psychological indeterm-
inacy and have confused it with what might be called epistemic vagueness.
The vagueness in the analogies cited above is due to there being insufficient
information available in order to determine whether a certain term applies
or not. In these cases one is merely not yet able to give a definite answer,
but one knows reasonably well what kind of observations would lead to a
positive or negative answer; it is just that, at present, one is not in a position
to make such observations because of insufficient evidence, lack of time
or inadequate instruments. If the vagueness is not epistemic, the use of
terms like ‘imprecise’ and ‘vague’ to (dis)qualify our ordinary judgements
is mistaken. These terms only have sense if their antithetical terms can be
UNCERTAINTY, VAGUENESS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INDETERMINACY 211
used and if the use of the antithetical terms is inconceivable, ‘imprecise’
and ‘vague’ lose their meaning.
7. PSYCHOLOGICAL INDETERMINACY AND PATTERNS OF LIFE
In this final Section, I will show in more detail how psychological concepts
are characterized by the indeterminate contours of their use. I will take
the concept of deceit as an example. As Feigl observed, the criteria for
distinguishing between mere pretence and genuine feeling are never stat-
able in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Feigl’s conclusion that
therefore overt behaviour is only a symptom of underlying and as yet inac-
cessible states and processes expresses his commitment to determinacy of
sense and the attendant denigration of concepts with indeterminate bound-
aries. Loosely-defined concepts are discounted and possibly replaced by
more exact concepts. In particular, the indeterminacy of the ordinary dis-
tinction between real and feigned expressions of feelings is taken as a sign
of the hiddenness of states and processes that would draw this distinction
more sharply.
On a Wittgensteinian view, instead, the indeterminacy of the relevant
distinction is an ineliminable feature of the concept of pretence since it
is just what we mean by this concept. According to Wittgenstein, “Words
have meaning only in the stream of life”.41 And applied to psychological
concepts, such as the concepts of moods and intentional attitudes (hope,
grief, expecting, intending): ‘grief’ describes “a pattern which recurs, with
different variations, in the weave of our life.42 Or about ‘lying’ and ‘pre-
tence’: “So we are talking about patterns in the weave of life”.43 By
introducing his notion of patterns in life Wittgenstein attempts develops
an alternative to a referentialistic account of the meaning of psychological
concepts. In particular, when Wittgenstein says that, say, ‘grief’ describes
a pattern in our life, he explicitly differentiates ascriptions of grief from,
rather than likening them to, sentences describing either bodily behaviour
or physiological states and processes. The dependency of psychological
concepts upon patterns of life implies that their use is governed by a loose
and shifting cluster of descriptions. These clusters may lack a definite or
determinate sense. Part of Wittgenstein’s attention for the actual function-
ing of psychological concepts is not to make psychological judgements
look more determinate or more predictive than they actually are; rather his
point is to get us to accept the indeterminacy and unpredictability of human
behaviour as part of their essence.
I will distinguish between the pattern and the ‘elements’ in which a
pattern manifests or expresses itself.44 Linguistic utterances, gestures, ac-
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tions and looks are the elements that can manifest particular psychological
patterns, much like the threads and colours in a woven fabric form the
pattern of the weave. The term ‘element’, however, is misleading since
the elements are not just confined to behaviour in the narrow sense, i.e.,
bodily movements and facial configurations, but include the context of
their occurrence. As Wittgenstein puts it by way of analogy: “A smiling
mouth smiles only in a human face”.45 Pursuing this comparison further
we can say that a smiling face expresses happiness only against the wider
background of the person’s behaviour, including other people’s reactions.
The meaning of ‘happiness’ is not its reference to one or another element
apart from a context and in that sense ‘element’ must not be understood
in terms of a referential theory of language. Identifying behaviour as the
expression of happiness is to identify its surrounding context. The mean-
ing of facial expressions, then, is a contextualized one, in terms of what
preceded them, what they are part of and what they are setting the stage
for.
There are some important features of psychological patterns that re-
inforce their indeterminacy and context-dependency. One of them is that
psychological patterns are variable and irregular, another one is that pat-
terns are interwoven with many others.46 The first feature can best be
illustrated by looking again at facial patterns. Facial patterns are varied
in a multiplicity of ways. Even in psychological patterns with rather sa-
lient elements none of the elements is essential to the pattern; particular
elements are replaceable by others or may even lack altogether and yet the
particular pattern remain intact. For instance, although smiling is a salient
feature of the pattern of happiness it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for being happy. Smiles may be part of the patterns of anger,
fear and sorrow and people who are happy need not smile. For short, there
is no definite answer to what combination of elements is necessary for
types of face patterns and what combination is sufficient. Instead there is
a great variety of elements, all of which have something to do with the
application of terms like ‘angry’, ‘shy’ or ‘annoyed’, yet we are unable
to draw any sharp boundary between those elements that are and are not
sufficient and/or necessary.
Recognizing that psychological concepts are characterized by the in-
determinate contours of their use is not to take the easy way out and to
put a halt to philosophical and psychological investigations; rather it is to
indicate which form these investigations will take. Psychological research
concerning the feigning of emotions in fact makes clear that the concept of
pretence is a family resemblance concept with indeterminate boundaries.
As Paul Ekman tells us, if someone is simulating fear he will probably
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assume a fear mouth and staring eyes.47 The absence of an eyebrow frown,
raised eyebrows and raised upper eyelids (in short: the presence of a blank
brow/forehead) may be a deception clue. However, it need not be. The
absence of these three facial features may also be an indication of the more
shocked fear. Moreover, these features may be absent even in a case of real
fear; some people don’t make these brow movements when they are in fear.
The same story could be told with respect to sadness. Some people never
show the sad brow/forehead, even when they are genuinely sad. The facial
features listed with respect to fear and sadness, then, are not necessary
conditions for judging that a person is genuinely sad or afraid. As it is hard
to make the fear brow/forehead and the sad brow/forehead voluntarily,
when they do occur together with the other features they may provide a
sufficient condition for the application of the term in question. But again,
some people may be very practised in simulating all these features.
Consideration of the temporal or dynamic context of pretence also re-
veals that this concept is characterized by indeterminate contours. The
role for motion in identifying face patterns is so important and subtile
that one could even distinguish conceptually between physiognomic pat-
terns, like the characteristic pattern of an angry expression, and patterns
of movement. The point is not just the experimental fact that photographic
negatives of famous faces are more easily identified if they are shown in
motion rather than as individual still images,48 but that the very distinction
between genuine and posed expressions is (also) made in terms of patterns
of movements. In order to judge whether an expression is genuine or posed
we must locate the facial display in a dynamic pattern of, for instance,
an ongoing dialogue, which includes the topic of conversation, preceding
utterances and expressions. Against this dynamic background an insincere
smile may reveal itself as being over-quick or too slow in comparison with
a genuine smile of pleasure. According to the psychologist Ekman, in order
to unmask a liar, timing is essential here: how long does it take for the
expression to appear on the face and how long does it take to fade into
another expression. And he adds: “There is no hard and fast [my italics]
general rule to tell you what the onset, duration, and offset are for each
of the emotions. We cannot say that anger must take no longer than 1.3
seconds to appear, cannot remain for more than 7 seconds, and abruptly
disappear. That obviously would be fallicious”.49 The crucial notion of
timing, then, is indeterminate.
Patterns are also interwoven with other patterns in human life. This
means that there are gradual transitions between patterns and, hence, that
there is no sharp break between patterns. This point can be illustrated by
the case of children learning to lie. Developmental psychological evidence
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shows that children ‘phantasize’ until age 5 and start lying by roughly age
7. What happens in between, in the transition period between phantasizing
and lying? ‘Folk psychology’ has a special term for this period: between
5 and 7 children neither phantasize nor lie, they fib.50 The conceptual dif-
ficulty here is that one knows what a child is capable of only if one first
has observed a certain course of actions. The concept of such a course,
however, is indeterminate in the sense that it is not a property of a separate
element at a specific time. To speak of a determinate beginning of this
course is therefore meaningless. What one can say is that only within a
pattern of life children can lie, but exactly when this pattern begins or at
which determinate point there is a transition from a preceding pattern to
this one are questions that make no sense to ask.
The ascription of many psychological concepts, then, depends upon
what people say and do, but whether what they say and do expresses joy,
hope, belief, genuine of faked joy, can be judged only by consideration of
the wider irregular context of their linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour.
The evidence for ascribing moods and intentional attitudes to other people,
therefore, does not consist of (internal or external) facts that obtain at the
time of the ascription, as both behaviourism and contemporary physicalism
assume, but of their irregular surrounding (and temporal) context.
One interesting result of this description is that deceit is itself a
pattern, hence, discriminable and not, as philosophers have assumed, a
phenomenon that disturbs all the outer evidence, so that a philosophical
theory seems to be required to retain the distinction between appearance
and reality.51 Concealment and deceit are patterns which make nondeceit-
ful patterns only more complicated than they (already) are. Qua patterns,
concealment and deceit are inherently indeterminate. To insist, as behavi-
ourism has done, that the evidence must be either genuine or feigned, is
simply to ignore the nature of patterns. To insist, as proponents of a theory
approach have done, that the presence of margins of evidence is a sign of
an epistemic defect due to our limited access to a person’s mind or brain,
is to ignore that indeterminacy is part of the very meaning of the concepts
of deceit, concealment and lying (and hence to ignore that and the ways in
which these concepts are based upon patterns).
A second interesting result is that we can account for disagreements
of psychological judgements, such as the fictive disagreement between
Chamberlain and Churchill I referred to at the beginning of this article,
in terms of the manner of judging the evidence without adopting a beha-
viouristic perspective. Although those who are personally acquainted with
a person can make even the most subtle psychological judgements, this
does not mean that they are capable of specifying conclusive criteria for
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their judgements. In this respect Wittgenstein speaks of ‘imponderable’
evidence52 Imponderable evidence is evidence which can make us certain
about someone’s psychological state, without our being able to specify
what it is in their behaviour that makes us so sure. Imponderable evidence
is, therefore, not the basis of a proof that another person is feeling such
and such. And if it makes no sense to speak of proving that another person
is, say, lying, it is not necessarily the case that one can convince a third
person on the basis of the evidence of the insincerity of the person’s words.
The dependency of psychological concepts upon irregular patterns of life,
therefore, opens up a possibility of disagreement and uncertainty, which is
characteristic of psychological judgements. As Wittgenstein observes:
Given the same evidence, one person can be completely convinced and another not be.
We don’t on that account exclude either one from society, as being unaccountable and
incapable of judgement.53
Wittgenstein contrasts in this respect judgements about the colour of ob-
jects or mathematical propositions with psychological judgements. When
disagreements arise about the colour of an object or the length of a rod,
people can usually locate the source of disagreement. They will measure
the rod again, if necessary with a more refined instrument, or they will
have another look at the colour of the object. If they still do not come to
terms, they can decide that one of them must be mistaken in his obser-
vations or that one of them does mean something different with a certain
term. In cases of disagreements about the sincerity of someone’s words or
expressions the undecidability does neither denote a deficiency in skill or
knowledge nor an inadequate command of certain terms. Rather, the inde-
terminacy is a constitutive feature of those judgements, a feature, that is,
that sets them apart from measurements of physical objects or judgements
about colour and points to affinities between psychological judgements
and aesthetic judgements. Discussions about works of art may also end
by admitting that the other person just sees or hears things differently,
without thereby implying that he has made a mistake in his observations
or was otherwise incompetent to judge. If there is disagreement about
the interpretation of a work of art there are no conclusive criteria people
can use to settle the dispute. To be sure, there are criteria, but they are
(objectively) uncertain, that is, they are not themselves beyond interpret-
ive dispute and appealing to them requires the same degree of insight as
making the judgements themselves.
Again, the appeal to criteria serves to remind us of the indetermin-
acy and context-dependency of psychological ascriptions and thereby to
point out the categorical difference between psychological concepts and
concepts for the description of all sorts of physical facts. The evidence
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provided by patterns involves essentially ‘margins of evidence’, and hence
no sharp boundaries between what we call sufficient evidence for thoughts
and feelings and what we call insufficient evidence. They are no less con-
cepts for this fact. Nor are they, by this fact alone, any less serviceable, for
we are normally quite capable of making the relevant distinctions.
The sceptical proposition which formed the point of departure of both
Feigl’s and Churchland’s worries about other minds, i.e., ‘How can one
be sure that another person is not just feigning, since one cannot know
what goes on in him’ can now be seen to mean something quite dif-
ferent. Although the proposition seems to deal with an experimental or
psychophysiological impossibility, inviting the construction of a powerful
epistemological method which will disclose that another person is really
feeling pain, it is in fact grammatical. The proposition stipulates how
to makes moves with the concept of feigning in a language-game and
is entirely normative.54 More in particular, the proposition expresses the
grammatical point that the rules for the use of the concept of pretence,
or the concept of lying, do not provide for conclusive evidence. The pro-
position does not say that there is something we cannot do or know, but
expresses that it makes no sense to speak of conclusive evidence in this
psychological area. As I have attempted to show in this section, this gram-
matical feature of certain psychological concepts resides in the form of life
fact that psychological patterns, upon which psychological judgements are
based, are indeterminate.55
Pointing out that it does not make sense to say this amounts to drawing
categorical distinctions between different sorts of concepts and language-
games. These distinctions are obliterated by behaviourists and physicalists
alike, for on their view there are merely gradual differences between our
normal psychological concepts and, respectively, an advanced behavioural
language and a neurophysiological language. In those latter two languages
we can say more precisely and more determinately what we can now say
only imprecisely and indeterminately. That is, our normal psychological
concepts and future ones can be measured on a single scale of precision,
with ordinary language-games at the inferior, i.e., least precise end of the
scale. The point of describing form of life facts is precisely to show that
ordinary psychological concepts and, say, neurolanguage-games, cannot
be measured on a single scale of precision. For if certain form of life facts
would not be the case the corresponding linguistic practice would not exist,
but there would be another – different – practice.56 Therefore, by playing
a neurolanguage-game we should not be getting precisely what we now
get at only imprecisely; rather it would be a different language-game. In
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that respect there is no precision that corresponds with or contradicts the
indeterminacy of psychological language-games.
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